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THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AS IT AFFECTS
CONTINGENT FUTURE INTERESTS IN MISSOURI
BY MCCUNE GILL
It was not until 1891 that the Missouri Supreme Court was
asked to decide a perpetuity case involving a contingent future
interest. From that time until 1935, twenty cases have been
brought before it. These decisions differ greatly from the de-
cisions in other States and from each other and form an inter-
esting chapter in the history of our local jurisprudence.
I.
The first case, Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162, 18 S. W. 1445,
involved a will devising land to the testator's children for life,
remainder to grandchildren for life, remainder to great-grand-
children in fee. The case went to Division No. 1 and Judge
Sherwood, one of our ablest judges, wrote the opinion. He some-
what surprised the real property lawyers of that day by deciding
that not only was the remainder to the great-grandchildren void
(because vesting after the death of possible future-born grand-
children), but that this partial invalidity destroyed the other
estates (although they must vest immediately or at the end of
lives in being, and therefore were valid). The rule against
perpetuities given by Washburn that a perpetuity is any estate
vesting (1) in unborn children of unborn children, or (2) after
lives and twenty-one years, is quoted and approved.
The next case, Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254, 57 S. W. 1065,
was decided in banc in 1900. It involved a devise to testator's
son and to any future wife of the son, for their lives, with re-
mainder to the son's children in fee. Although this is obviously
valid because all estates vest at the son's death, it was so decided
by only a bare majority (four to three), Judge Sherwood and
two other judges, Burgess and Marshall, being the dissenters.
In the second edition of Gray on Perpetuities, published in
1906, the author takes issue with the foregoing views and says
that he "hopes the learned Court of Missouri will come into line
with other States in later decisions," and not hold an entire will
void for a partial invalidity. Gray on Perpetuities 2nd Edition,
Sec. 249a.
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II.
By 1907 Judge Sherwood had left the bench, but his ideas on
perpetuities were completely taken over by Judge Woodson, who
was later, during a long and distinguished career on the bench,
to write or concur in seven majority and minority opinions de-
nouncing perpetuities. His first opinion was in a case, Shepperd
v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S. W. 989, which went to Division
No. 1, and involved a will devising property to testator's daughter
for life with remainder to her bodily heirs forever if they have
issue, otherwise to revert to testator and his heirs. It would
have been easy for the court to say that all the estates vested in
time, the remainder to bodily heirs subject to be divested in favor
of a vested reversion. But Judge Woodson held the entire will
void, including even certain other devises in fee. Two of the
other judges of the Division, Valliant and Lamm, concurred.
The next case, Bradford v. Blossom, 190 Mo. 110, 140, 88 S. W.
721, (1905), 207 Mo. 177, 233, 105 S. W. 289 (1907), involved a
complicated situation, where it was contended that a will was ob-
tained by fraud and did not express the intention of the testatrix.
The case went to the Supreme Court twice, and on the second
appeal in banc Judge Woodson solved the difficulty by declaring
the will wholly void as containing perpetuities, although it pro-
vided that distribution should be made when the youngest of the
children of the life tenants became twenty-one years of age. All
of the judges concurred, including Judges Gantt, Burgess,
Valliant and Lamm.
A conveyance in trust (rather than a will) next came before
the Court in 1908, Buxton v. Kroeger, 219 Mo. 224, 117 S. W.
1147, and Judges Graves, Burgess and Lamm joined with Judge
Fox in deciding the case without considering the question of
perpetuities. Woodson, Valliant and Gantt dissented. Woodson
thought the deed was void as a perpetuity, and said that "the law
against perpetuities is conceded by all to be one of the best and
wisest laws extant." The conveyance provided a trust for the
present and future children of the grantors until ten years after
the youngest child should become of age whereupon the trustees
were to convey to children living and the heirs of children de-
ceased. Some courts would have held only the transgressive ten
years void and would have saved the rest of the trust.
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The next will was a simple affair devising lands to daughters
for life with remainders to the heirs of their bodies but if any
one of them should die without heirs of her body then to the
testator's other heirs. The only claim to a perpetuity was that
"any one of them" might apply to the heirs of the body as well
as to the daughters, but this claim was so flimsy that Division
No. 1, including Judge Woodson, very properly held the will
valid, Cox v. Jones, 229 Mo. 53, 129 S. W. 495 (1910).
At this juncture Professor Hudson of Missouri University
wrote a lengthy article, University of Missouri Law Series, Vol.
3, page 3 (1914) protesting against the trend of these decisions,
whereby an entire will was held void because of a partial in-
validity. He also thinks there is no rule as to an unborn child of
an unborn life tenant apart from the lives and twenty-one years
period, of the rule against perpetuities, and surely no rule in-
validating an estate to an "unborn child of an unborn child,"
(erroneously) believed to exist by Washburn and the Missouri
court.
In 1915 the third edition of Gray on Perpetuities was published
and the author repeats his former comment on total invalidity
for partial remoteness, but admits that his previous advice was
not accepted by the Missouri Court, Gray on Perpetuities, 3rd
Edition (1915), Section 249a.
In 1916 a will came before Division No. 1 whereby a testatrix
devised her property to her eight children, "but in case any of
them, or their descendants die, then to the survivors, and in no
event to become the property of strangers to my blood." This
might have been construed to refer to death during the life of the
testatrix, but Judge Blair, (Woodson and Graves concurring),
held the entire will void, Riley v. Jaeger, 189 S. W. 1168.
This decision inspired Professor Hudson again to comment
unfavorably on the Court's view of the effect of partial perpetu-
ities, University of Mo. Law Series, Vol. 14, page 53 (1917).
But his suggestions again went unheeded.
III.
The next case went to Division No. 2, composed of Judges
Walker, Williams and Faris, all eminent jurists. It seems that
Judge Walker's views on perpetuities differed from those of
Judge Woodson, who sat in No. 1, and this is the first of four
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decisions joined in by Walker denying claims of perpetuities.
The case, Deacon v. Trust Co. 271 Mo. 669, 197 S. W. 261 (1917),
was a thirty year trust, to be distributed at the end of that period
to children then living or the issue of those dead. Judge Walker
held the trust valid. This decision might have been put on the
ground that only the excess over 21 years was void. However,
the Judge chose to construe the word "issue" to mean immediate
issue at the time of the children's death, thus vesting the bene-
ficial interests at the end of an existing life. Judges Faris and
Williams concurred. Washburn's definition of a perpetuity ap-
pears to have been abandoned and Gray's definition substituted,
namely, that "the right to future enjoyment of an estate must
vest within 21 years after a life in being at the time of the
creation of the interest."
The next will in Walter v. Dickmann, 274 Mo. 185, 202 S. W.
537 (1918), provided that trustees were to pay income to a
named person for life and after his death to be paid to his chil-
dren and their heirs and assigns forever. The claim that this
trust continued during the lives of possibly future born children
was denied by Division No. 2 (Judges Walker, Faris and Wil-
liams), and the children were held to have vested interests be-
cause a gift of income from personal property is a gift of an
absolute estate in the property.
In 1919, a deed came before Division No. 1 and was held valid
in an opinion written by Commissioner Ragland (Hudspeth v.
Grumke, 214 S. W. 865). It sets up various estates in named
persons with remainders to their "children and the children of
deceased children." The Commissioner's opinion holding the deed
valid was concurred in by Judges Woodson, Blair, Graves and
Bond.
The next problem arose in a case, Melvin v. Hoffman, 290 Mo.
464, 235 S. W. 107 (1922), involving a deed creating a life
estate to a possibly future born wife of the life tenant; there
was also a twenty-one year trust for children and a final re-
mainder to living sisters. The Court in banc held that all of the
estates must vest in time. Judge Woodson dissented, as Judge
Sherwood had done in a previous similar case. The trust con-
tained a provision for accumulation but the court held that this
only applied during the grantor's life estate. In this way the
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learned Judges avoided passing on accumulations during a future
born life.
The next will came before the court in 1922, Lane v. Garrison,
293 Mo. 530, 239 S. W. 813. It provided for the accumulation of
a large part of income during a living grandson's life and during
the minority of his children, with prohibition against alienation.
The case went to Division No. 1. Commissioner Small wrote the
opinion holding the trust valid. Judges Blair, Graves, Elder, and
Woodson concurred.
Immediately following the preceding case, a will was presented
to Division No. 2, which taxed the ingenuity of Judge Walker,
who, following his usual inclinations, sought to uphold it. The
devise (Schee v. Boone, 295 Mo. 212, 243 S. W. 882, [1922] ), was
to the testator's widow for life, remainder to a daughter for life,
remainder to the heirs of her body, but if any of the bodily heirs
died without issue then to the others living, or to the issue of
any of the others who had died. It is obvious that the latter
interest is void, and (in Missouri) the whole will thereby should
fail. But Judge Walker saved it, by holding that the last estate
was void as repugnant to the fee of the heirs of the body of the
daughter. Incidentally, in the sixty Missouri cases involving
shifting executory devises, thirty of such shifting interests have
been held good, and thirty bad.
In 1922, a case, (Loud v. Trust Co. 298 Mo. 148, 249 S. W.
629) which must have delighted the heart of the learned Judge
Woodson, veteran enemy of perpetuities, came before Division
No. 1. It involved a will creating a trust for a daughter (aged
54), for life, with remainder to three living grandchildren, and
any thereafter born, to become their absolute property at age 40,
or if they had died, to their issue at age 21. Judge Woodson
wrote the opinion, Judges Graves and Ragland concurring. The
court held that the daughter might have other children and their
issue would be unborn children of unborn children. The court
also held (contrary to the previous ruling of Division No. 2)
that "issue" meant remote and not immediate issue. Whereupon
the entire will was held to be void. Professor Gray's definition
of a perpetuity is again quoted and approved.
A year later Judge Woodson made his last appearance as the
foe of perpetuities. Commissioner Small wrote the opinion,
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adopted by Judges Woodson, Blair, Graves and Ragland. The
case, Mockbee v. Grooms, 300 Mo. 446, 254 S. W. 170 (1923),
devised real estate to a daughter for life, remainder in trust for
her present or future children until the youngest became twenty-
five, then to be divided between such children, otherwise to
charity. The entire clause was held void. Because of the fact
that previous decisions had held entirely separate clauses in
wills, devising other property in fee, to be void, a similar claim
was made here, but the court denied the contention.
Here a testator gave his large dry goods business to trustees
to conduct the same and pay the proceeds to numerous bene-
ficiaries or their descendants, Plummer v. Roberts, 315 Mo. 627,
287 S. W. 316 (1926). There was no time stated for the termina-
tion of the trust. The court in banc including Judges Walker,
White, Atwood and Ragland held the trust valid on the theory
that the testator must have intended it to terminate before
twenty-one years had elapsed.
Five years later, in 1931, Division No. 2 considered one of the
new "living" trusts which was very much like a will but which
fortunately created remainders to descendants of children named
by name, instead of designating them as the class "children."
This made the remainders valid even though the period was to
be measured from the delivery of the deed. What seemed to be
life estates to possibly future born husbands and wives of chil-
dren, were created, which would be void in a deed; but the Court
held them to terminate at the death of the last surviving named
child, thus making them good. Judge Henwood wrote the opinion
which was concurred in by Judges Blair and White; Davis v.
Rossi, 326 Mo. 911, 34 S. W. 2nd 8. The court says its "duty is to
adopt a construction which will not offend the rule against per-
petuities," a new view in Missouri.
The next case, decided in 1932, Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580,
46 S. W. 2nd 135, involved a will creating a trust for children
and their "lineal descendants" until 20 years after the final
settlement of the testator's estate. Although this is obviously
void as written, the court in banc held it to be valid by constru-
ing that "descendants" means immediate issue, and that "final
settlement of the estate" means the date of testator's death.
Judge Frank wrote the opinion. Judges Atwood, Gantt, White,
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Henwood and Ellison concurred. The court again says that "a
doubtful trust will be upheld if possible."
The next case, Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 332 Mo. 402, 58 S. W.
2nd 449, (1933), was rather free from difficulties except only
the contention that the "unborn child of an unborn child" doc-
trine should invalidate a trust for sons and their heirs until the
death of the survivor of the sons. Division No. 1 (Judges Frank,
Gantt, and Atwood, opinion by Ferguson), held the estates valid.
The honorable Court says that the rule does not destroy this
trust because the rule applies only to an unborn child of an un-
born "life tenant."
Thus do we see how four cases were decided, by both divisions
and by the court in banc, in favor of validity, over a period of
twelve years. In some of these decisions somewhat strained
constructions were used to make the estates comply with the
rule, as such constructions had previously been used to defeat
similar estates. Hence it seemed to some observers that the
learned Missouri Court with its new judges had departed from
its former strict views on the perpetuity question. But in the
next case, decided in 1935 (the last one to date), Trust Company
v. Bassett, 85 S. W. 2nd 569, the Court returned to its former
principles. Judges Gantt and Frank (who had theretofore leaned
toward validity), and Judges Collet and Hays held the will void
per curiam in No. 1. It involved a complicated trust continuing
until living named beneficiaries should attain the age of 40, for
such beneficiaries or their descendants, with remainders upon
death without descendants to the other "beneficiaries named."
The court held that "attain age 40" meant when they would attain
such age even though dead, and that "beneficiaries named" in-
cluded not only those mentioned by name but also those not
named but merely designated by class. The entire trust, including
the valid provisions, was held void. The court also announces
that it will follow the rule that estates created by the exercise of
a power to appoint by will, must be construed as of the date of
the original will creating the power, although many States hold
otherwise as to general powers of appointment.
IV.
From the above comments one sees something of the variant
views on perpetuities, of the two divisions of the Missouri Su-
Washington University Open Scholarship
216 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
preme Court, and of the learned and distinguished judges vho
have occupied the bench at different times. After twenty de-
cisions over a period of forty-four years it seems that we are still
far from a determination of what the Rule against Perpetuities
in Missouri is, or how the Court will construe limitations in wills
and deeds. Hence we are quite unable to hazard a guess as to
whether difficult contingent future interests vill be held valid
or invalid. But we do know that, by successive decisions, our
honorable Court has firmly established the doctrine that the
merest possibility of invalidity in the smallest future interest
will render the entire devise void.
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